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https://w.atwiki.jp/gohongilab2/pages/21.html
tags standard Shapiro_C auther Shapiro, C. bibtex @article{Shapiro1996antitrust, title={{Antitrust in network industries}}, author={Shapiro, C.}, year={1996}, publisher={U.S. Department of Justice} } memo cited as Doi200104Gijyutsu(P.4) real network (利用者が直接につながる「実体的ネットワーク」 virtual network (互換性のある技術を採用した製品の利用者の集合である「仮想ネットワーク」
https://w.atwiki.jp/gohongilab2/pages/27.html
tags Kumaraswamy_A OSS Sun case competition_in_standardization standard strategy strategy_for_standardization Garud_R url auther Garud, R. and Kumaraswamy, A. bibtex @article{GarudKumaraswamy1993changing, title={{Changing competitive dynamics in network industries An exploration of Sun Microsystems' open systems strategy}}, author={Garud, R. and Kumaraswamy, A.}, journal={Strategic Management Journal}, volume={14}, number={5}, pages={351--369}, issn={1097-0266}, year={1993} } format for references AIS Garud, R., Jain, S., and Kumaraswamy, A. 2002. “Institutional entrepreneurship in the sponsorship of common technological standards The case of Sun Microsystems and Java,” Academy of Management Journal (45 1), pp.196-214. abstract memo abstract Sun Microsystes provides rivals easy access to its technical knowledge and encourages them to enter its workstation market. This paper employs theoretical insights on technological systems and network externalities to understand Sun's open systems strategy. The paper also explores the changing nature of competition in network industries-industries characterized by network externalities and built around technological systems. P351 Left \cite{Porter1998competitive} suggests that firms erect entry an mobility barriers to limit competition among themselves. \cite{Reed1990causal} explore how firms can generate causal ambiguity to prevent rivals from duplicating distinctive competencies. \cite{Teece1986profiting} highlights the imprtance of appropriability regimes that provide firms with an opportunity to earn abovenormal profits through the introduction of new technologies. @book{Porter1998competitive, title={{Competitive strategy techniques for analyzing industries and competitors with a new introduction}}, author={Porter, M.E.}, isbn={0684841487}, year={1998}, publisher={Free Press} } @article{Reed1990causal, title={{Causal ambiguity, barriers to imitation, and sustainable competitive advantage}}, author={Reed, R. and DeFillippi, R.J.}, journal={Academy of management Review}, volume={15}, number={1}, pages={88--102}, issn={0363-7425}, year={1990} } @article{Teece1986profiting, title={{Profiting from technological innovation Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy}}, author={Teece, D.J.}, journal={Research policy}, volume={15}, number={6}, pages={285--305}, issn={0048-7333}, year={1986} } Why, then, would a firm provide rivals easy access to its technical knowledge and encourage entry into its market? What are the sources of competitive advantage for a firm that provides rivals easy access to its technical knowledge? P352 left All these industries consists of interrelated markets, each producing components of a larger technological system . These industries are also characterized by network externalities \cite{KatzShapiro1985network, FarrellSaloner1986installed, BesenSaloner1989economics, CrandallFlamm1989changing} @article{KatzShapiro1985network, title={{Network externalities, competition, and compatibility}}, author={Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C.}, journal={The American economic review}, volume={75}, number={3}, pages={424--440}, issn={0002-8282}, year={1985} } @article{FarrellSaloner1986installed, title={{Installed base and compatibility Innovation, product preannouncements, and predation}}, author={Farrell, J. and Saloner, G.}, journal={The American Economic Review}, volume={76}, number={5}, pages={940--955}, issn={0002-8282}, year={1986} } @incollection{BesenSaloner1989economics, title={{The economics of telecommunications standards}}, author={Besen, S.M. and Saloner, G.}, booktitle={Changing the rules Technological change, international competition, and regulation in communications}, editor={Crandall, R.W. and Flamm, K.}, isbn={0815715951}, year={1989}, publisher={Brookings Institution Press} year={1989} } @book{CrandallFlamm1989changing, title={{Changing the rules technological change, international competition, and regulation in communications}}, editor={Crandall, R.W. and Flamm, K.}, isbn={0815715951}, year={1989}, publisher={Brookings Institution Press} } Right Standard-based technologies and network interconnections break several `isolating mechanisms' \cite{Rumelt1984towards} that (1) prevent rivals from gaining acess to technical knowledge embodied in components and their interface standards, and (2) keep users locked into networks because of high switching and transient imcompativility costs \cite{FarrellSaloner1986installed}. @article{Rumelt1984towards, title={{Towards a strategic theory of the firm}}, author={Rumelt, R.P.}, journal={Resources, firms, and strategies A reader in the resource-based perspective}, pages={131--145}, year={1984} } @article{FarrellSaloner1986installed, title={{Installed base and compatibility Innovation, product preannouncements, and predation}}, author={Farrell, J. and Saloner, G.}, journal={The American Economic Review}, volume={76}, number={5}, pages={940--955}, issn={0002-8282}, year={1986}, publisher={JSTOR} } With the dissolution of isolating mechanisms, firms that wish to survive must introduce new products continually. Therefore, the workstation market is characterized by rapid technical change. In this rapidly changing environment, Sun exploits transient monopoly positions \cite{MacmillanEtAl1985competitors} that are created through its role as atechnology sponsor. A sponsor is a firm willing to invest in the development of a technology while sharing breakthroughs with others to promote its technology as the industry standard. @article{MacmillanEtAl1985competitors, title={{Competitors' responses to easily imitated new products—exploring commercial banking product introductions}}, author={MacMillan, I. and McCaffery, M.L. and Van Wijk, G.}, journal={Strategic Management Journal}, volume={6}, number={1}, pages={75--86}, issn={1097-0266}, year={1985} } In this paper, we introduce the notion of economies of substitution to explain how Sun has been able to offer new products by economizing on the resource consumptive R\ D process. P353 Technological systems consist of a set of components that together provide utility to users. System performance is dependent not only upon constituent components, but also on the extent to which they are compatible with each other (\cite{Gabel1987open; 93, [[HendersonClark1990architectural]], TushmanRosenkopf1986organizational}. @inarticle{Gabel1987open, title={{Open standards in the European computer industry The case of X/OPEN}}, author={Gabel, H.L.}, booktitle={Product standardization and competitive strategy}, editor={Gabel, H.L.}, pages={91--123}, publisher={Elsevier Science} year={1987} } @article{HendersonClark1990architectural, title={{Architectural innovation the reconfiguration of existing product technologies and the failure of established firms}}, author={Henderson, R.M. and Clark, K.B.}, journal={Administrative science quarterly}, volume={35}, number={1}, year={1990}, pages={9--30}, publisher={Cornell University, Johnson Graduate School} } @article{TushmanRosenkopf1986organizational, title={{Organizational Determinants of Technological Change Towards a Sociology of Technological Evolution}}, author={Tushman, M.L. and Rosenkopf, L.}, journal={Research in organizational behavior}, editor={Staw, B. and Cummings, L.} volume={14}, year={1986} } One way to ensure copatibility is to custom-design individual system components to facilitate their interactions. Another way to ensure compativility is to design components that confirm to a common set of standards. By standards, we mean codified specifications about components and their relatonal attributes \footnote{}. \footnote{ \cite{David1987SomeNewStandards} provies a comprehensive taxonomy of standards that include conformance to \item an ordinal scate \item a cardinal scale \item a dichotomous set. } @incollection{David1987SomeNewStandards, title={{Some new standards for the economics of standardization in the information age}}, author={David, P.}, booktitle={Economic policy and technological performance}, editor={P. Dasgupta and P. Stoneman}, pages={206--239.}, isbn={0521022215}, year={1987}, publisher={Cambridge Univ Press} } P354 Right Proprietery control over technical knowledge provides dominant firms the porwer to set the rules by which rivals must play \cite{AdamsBlock1982Integrated}. @article{AdamsBlock1982Integrated, title={{Integrated Monopoly and Market Power System Selling, Compatibility Standards, and Market Control}}, author={Adams, W. and Block, J. W.}, journal={The Quarterly Review of Economics and Business}, volume={22}, number={4}, pages={29--42}, year={1982} } Proprietary control over technical knowledge also protects dominant firms from newentrants because system-users incur transient imcompatibility costs \cite{FarrellSaloner1986installed}, P356 left Indeed, they may be determined by the possession (and exercise) of naked power to set the rules by which any and all comers shall be allowed to play the game \cite{AdamsBlock1982Integrated}. Table.2 specialized component manufactures コメント：機能拡張の歴史。social graphなど、どんどん上のレイヤに上がっていく。 縦軸competitive marketにconsortium standards が加わるとどう展開するか。 P356 Right There are two options for entrants and rivals to operate in a Quadrant 2 (Monopoly market/ Integrated system manufactures) \cite{Flamm1988creating}. \item to offer products for niche markets that do not attrace the attention of the dominant system manufacturer \item to operate in compatible component markets desigated by the dominant system-manufacturer. @book{Flamm1988creating, title={{Creating the computer government, industry, and high technology}}, author={Flamm, K.}, isbn={0815728506}, year={1988}, publisher={Brookings Institution Press} } P357 left integrated system-manufacuturing provides a source of competitive advantage through the manipulation of undisclosed interface specifications. Integrated system-manufacturers also have the opportunity to bundle their products and engage in tie-in sales thereby reaping above normanl profits (e.g \cite{Burstein1960economics} \cite{DansbyConrad1984commodity} \cite{MatutesRegibeau1988mix}). Therefore, integrated system-manufacturing might appear to be an appealing source of competitive advantage. @article{Burstein1960economics, title={{The economics of tie-in sales}}, author={Burstein, M.L.}, journal={The Review of Economics and Statistics}, volume={42}, number={1}, pages={68--73}, issn={0034-6535}, year={1960} } @article{DansbyConrad1984commodity, title={{Commodity bundling}}, author={Dansby, R.E. and Conrad, C.}, journal={The American Economic Review}, volume={74}, number={2}, pages={377--381}, issn={0002-8282}, year={1984} } @article{MatutesRegibeau1988mix, title={{" Mix and match" product compatibility without network externalities}}, author={Matutes, C. and Regibeau, P.}, journal={The RAND Journal of Economics}, volume={19}, number={2}, pages={221--234}, issn={0741-6261}, year={1988} } rather than remain an integrated system-manuracturer, a firm in a network industry might choose to increase system viability by licensing its technology to other firms in complementary markets and to rivals \cite{Conner1995obtaining}. @article{Conner1995obtaining, title={{Obtaining Strategic Advantage from Being Imitated When Can Encouraging" Clones" Pay?}}, author={Conner, K.R.}, journal={Management Science}, volume={41}, number={2}, pages={209--225}, issn={0025-1909}, year={1995} } @article{Conner1995obtaining, title={{Obtaining Strategic Advantage from Being Imitated When Can Encouraging" Clones" Pay?}}, author={Conner, K.R.}, journal={Management Science}, volume={41}, number={2}, pages={209--225}, issn={0025-1909}, year={1995} } cited as
https://w.atwiki.jp/gohongilab2/pages/16.html
tags Doi_N standard auther Doi_N bibtex @BOOK{Doi200104Gijyutsu, title={技術標準と競争 - 企業戦略と公共政策}, author={土井 教之}, publisher={日本経済評論社}, year={2001}, month={4}, isbn={9784818813267}, url={http //amazon.co.jp/o/ASIN/4818813265/}, price={￥ 2,940}, totalpages={270}, timestamp={2011.02.14}, } memo \chapter{1 序章} definition of "standard" 生産者、需要者などが支配的、標準的と認知する、製品、工程、サービス、インタフェース、材料、ビジネスプロセスなどの特性 (p.1) categorization of "standard" fromGrindley1995standards interface/ compatibility standard quality standard (p.3) from p.22 table 2-1 of @book{Grindley1995standards, title={{Standards, strategy and policy Cases and stories}}, author={Grindley, P.}, isbn={0198288077}, year={1995}, publisher={Oxford University Press, USA} } from Shapiro1996antitrust real network (利用者が直接につながる「実体的ネットワーク」 virtual network (互換性のある技術を採用した製品の利用者の集合である「仮想ネットワーク」 (P.4) from @article{Shapiro1996antitrust, title={{Antitrust in network industries}}, author={Shapiro, C.}, year={1996}, publisher={U.S. Department of Justice} }
https://w.atwiki.jp/nishitamaonline/pages/116.html
特定非営利活動法人JUON(樹恩) NETWORK じゅおんねっとわーく JUON NETWORKは、都市と農山漁村の人々をネットワークで結ぶことにより環境の保全改良、地方文化の発掘と普及、過疎過密の問題の解決に取り組み、自立・協助の志で新しい価値観と生活様式を創造していくことを目的としています。 目次 特定非営利活動法人JUON(樹恩) NETWORK設立 活動地域拠点施設 活動フィールド 定例活動日 主な活動内容この会でできる活動 団体アピール 今後の活動予定 連絡先 団体ホームページ 活動・イベント掲載情報 上に戻る 設立 １９９８年４月 上に戻る 活動地域 拠点施設 （該当なし） 活動フィールド 鳩ノ巣フィールド（東京都奥多摩町棚沢） 東京都内以外にも、全国各地で活動を行っています。 上に戻る 定例活動日 毎月第２土曜日（東京ヤングジュオン） 毎月第３日曜日（多摩の森・大自然塾） 上に戻る 主な活動内容 森林保全活動として、国産間伐材製「樹恩割り箸」の普及推進や森づくり体験プログラム「森林の楽校（もりのがっこう）」（2009年度は秋田、群馬、埼玉、東京、新潟、富山、岐阜、兵庫、徳島、香川、高知、長崎）、「森林ボランティア青年リーダー養成講座」（東京、兵庫）等を開催しています。 また、援農体験プログラム「田畑の楽校（はたけのがっこう）」や都市と農山漁村を結ぶ人材を育てる資格検定制度「エコサーバー検定」等も実施しています。 この会でできる活動 下表の「◎」、「○」の作業ができます。（季節的にできる作業が限られます） 地ごしらえ ○ 作業道・遊歩道づくり ○ 植樹 ○ 収穫作業 ◎ 下刈り ◎ 獣害対策 ○ 除伐・大刈り ○ 丸太切り・木工体験 ○ 枝打ち ◎ 山散策・見学会 ○ 間伐 ◎ 炭焼き その他 → 作業内容の解説 上に戻る 団体アピール 活動にはあらゆる世代の方が参加していますが、大学生協が呼びかけた組織ということもあり、学生を中心とした青年層の参加が比較的多く、世代間交流のできることが特徴となっています。 上に戻る 今後の活動予定 毎月第３日曜日は、「多摩の森・大自然塾」（主催：森づくりフォーラム・後援：東京都・協力：森林インストラクター東京会・事務局：JUON NETWORK）を実施しています。 また、秋からは「森林ボランティア青年リーダー養成講座」（５回連続講座）を開催します。 上に戻る 連絡先 事務局juon-office@univcoop.or.jp 上に戻る 団体ホームページ JUON(樹恩) NETWORKへようこそhttp //juon.univcoop.or.jp/ 上に戻る 活動・イベント掲載情報 JUON(樹恩) NETWORKの活動・イベントhttp //www21.atwiki.jp/nishitamaonline/pages/111.html 上に戻る
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今日 - 合計 - FIGHTING NETWORK RINGSの攻略ページ 目次 基本情報 [部分編集] ストーリー [部分編集] 攻略情報 [部分編集] Tips [部分編集] プチ情報 [部分編集] 関連動画 [部分編集] 参考文献、参考サイト [部分編集] 感想・レビュー 基本情報 [部分編集] ストーリー [部分編集] 攻略情報 [部分編集] Tips [部分編集] プチ情報 [部分編集] 関連動画 [部分編集] 参考文献、参考サイト [部分編集] 感想・レビュー 名前 コメント 選択肢 投票 役に立った (0) 2012年10月09日 (火) 16時38分05秒 [部分編集] ページごとのメニューの編集はこちらの部分編集から行ってください [部分編集] 編集に関して
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tags DoCoMo PDC case de_jure_standard dominant_design industry_architecture standard strategy Funk_J_L url auther Funk, J.L. bibtex @article{Funk2003standards, title={{Standards, dominant designs and preferential acquisition of complementary assets through slight information advantages}}, author={Funk, J.L.}, journal={Research Policy}, volume={32}, number={8}, pages={1325--1341}, year={2003}, publisher={Elsevier} } format for references 経営情報学会 Funk, J.L. "Standards, dominant designs and preferential acquisition of complementary assets through slight information advantages", Research Policy, Vol.32, No.8, 2003, pp. 1325-1341 CIRIEC Japan Funk, J.L. [2003] 「Standards, dominant designs and preferential acquisition of complementary assets through slight information advantages｣, 『Research Policy』, 32巻8号, pp. 1325-1341 LNBIP Funk, J.L. Standards, dominant designs and preferential acquisition of complementary assets through slight information advantages. In Research Policy. vol.32, no.8, pp. 1325-1341. (2003) memo Abstract the leading Japanese cellular service provider (NTT DoCoMo) offered preferencial information about the "open" Japanese digital phone standard in return for preferentioal access to the lightest phones from four phone suppliers. These four phone suppliers used the preferential access to this information to obtain preferential cooperation from parts suppliers and to make better design tradeoffs between parts than the other phone suppliers. These superior design tradeoffs enabled the DoCoMo suppliers to crate various dominant designs within the Personal Digital Cellular (PDC) standard. The creation of these dominant designs forced other phone and part manufactureres to change their desing strategies and copy the designs used by the DoCoMo phone and part suppliers. pp.1325-6 the suppliers may take the lione s share of the profits if the complementary asset is a bottleneck \cite{Teece1986profiting}. Teece1986profiting @article{Teece1986profiting, title={{Profiting from technological innovation Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy}}, author={Teece, D.J.}, journal={Research policy}, volume={15}, number={6}, pages={285--305}, issn={0048-7333}, year={1986}, publisher={Elsevier} } pp.1326 This paper discusses how firms can use slight information advantages to obtain preferential access to complementary assets and create multi-level dominant designs. Following the emergence of dominant design, problem solving moves into more detailed levels in the design hierarchy \cite{Clark1985interaction, NelsonWinter1982evolutionary}. Clark1985interaction @article{Clark1985interaction, title={{The interaction of design hierarchies and market concepts in technological evolution}}, author={Clark, K.B.}, journal={Research Policy}, volume={14}, number={5}, pages={235--251}, issn={0048-7333}, year={1985}, publisher={Elsevier} } NelsonWinter1982evolutionary @book{NelsonWinter1982evolutionary, title={{An evolutionary theory of economic change}}, author={Nelson, R.R. and Winter, S.G.}, isbn={0674272285}, year={1982}, publisher={Belknap Press of Harvard University Press} } Both the innovator and the holders of the complementary assets can reap the benefits from creating multi-level dominant designs. The innovator can receive preferencial access to the complementary assets in return for preferentioal information and guarantees of heavy investments. pp.1327 In the industrial standard s literature, firm behavior and network externalities have a strong effect on which design becomes an industrial standard through the so-called bandwagon effect. Since the number of users has a direct effect on the value of the product, market share becomes a measure of quality and a rising market share increases the product s charm. Thus, the acquisition of an early installed base and the opening the standard in order to acquire an early installed base are accepted strategies for making your product or technology an industrial standard \cite{Rofles1974theory, OrenSmith1981critical, FarrellSaloner1985standardization, KatzShapiro1985network, Asaba1995cooperation, ShapiroVarian1999information}. Rofles1974theory J. Rofles, A theory of interdependent demand for a communications service. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science vol. 5 no, 1 (1974), pp. 16–37. OrenSmith1981critical @article{OrenSmith1981critical, title={{Critical mass and tariff structure in electronic communications markets}}, author={Oren, S.S. and Smith, S.A.}, journal={The Bell Journal of Economics}, volume={12}, number={2}, pages={467--487}, issn={0361-915X}, year={1981}, publisher={JSTOR} } FarrellSaloner1985standardization @article{FarrellSaloner1985standardization, title={{Standardization, compatibility, and innovation}}, author={Farrell, J. and Saloner, G.}, journal={The RAND Journal of Economics}, volume={16}, number={1}, pages={70--83}, issn={0741-6261}, year={1985}, publisher={JSTOR} } KatzShapiro1985network @article{KatzShapiro1985network, title={{Network externalities, competition, and compatibility}}, author={Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C.}, journal={The American economic review}, volume={75}, number={3}, pages={424--440}, issn={0002-8282}, year={1985}, publisher={JSTOR} } Asaba1995cooperation @BOOK{Asaba1995cooperation, title={競争と協力の戦略 - 業界標準をめぐる企業行動}, author={淺羽 茂}, publisher={有斐閣}, year={1995}, month={3}, isbn={9784641067257}, url={http //amazon.co.jp/o/ASIN/4641067252/}, price={￥ 4,095}, totalpages={213}, timestamp={2011.04.07}, } ドミナントデザインでは、ネットワーク外部性よりも技術的優劣が影響力を持つ。標準はネットワーク外部性が大きく影響する、、、というよりも、それが全て。 The dominat design literature is much less clear on how domina t designs emerge and how firms can make their products or technology a dominat design. The literature generally argues that technical factors play a more important role than network externalities and openness. This suggests that firms compete solely in terms of technology and the competition between alternative product forms is determined by technical factors and economies of scale \cite{AbernathyUtterback1978patterns, AndersonTushman1990technological, HendersonClark1990architectural, Utterback1996mastering}. AbernathyUtterback1978patterns AndersonTushman1990technological @article{AndersonTushman1990technological, title={{Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs A Cyclical Model of Technological Change.}}, author={Anderson, P. and Tushman, M.L.}, journal={Administrative science quarterly}, volume={35}, number={4}, year={1990}, publisher={Cornell University, Johnson Graduate School} } pp.1328 When firms open their technology in order to have it adopted as a standard they retain early mover advantages. By creating a dominant design at a detailed level in the design hierarchy, the innovator and the holders of the complementary assets are able to further delay the imitator s access to the preferential complementary assets. And in the current era of rapid technological change, a few yearscan often be enough time to establish a sufficient financial and brand image advantage and use this advantage to prepare for the next thchnological discontinuity. \section{11. Discussion} pp.1339 firms can influenc the emergence of dominant designs. NTT DoCoMo and its suppliers heavily influenced the resulting dominant design through their information advantages. DoCoMo s phone suppliers used their greater knowledge of the PDC standard to make better design tradeoffs. NTT DoCoMo did have the largest shre in the market when it was implementing its starategy and wothout this large share, it would probably have been hard to implement the strategy. this paper has identified some of the conditions that are necessary to use the "multi-level dominant design" strategy. pp.1340 Often times the most important aspects of a standard are not included in the documents but instead are written "between the lines". これ、webでやったら、developerが対応できないから、無理。web標準は万人が活用できる仕様書となる。 cited as
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Network/2006年03月20日/Firewall越しのTFTP Network/2006年03月20日/ポート番号? #blognavi
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Cusumano_M_A Gawer_A platform strategy platform title How companies become platform leaders authers Gawer, A. and Cusumano, M.A. bibtex @article{GawerCusumano2008how, title={{How companies become platform leaders}}, author={Gawer, A. and Cusumano, M.A.}, journal={MIT Sloan management review}, volume={49}, number={2}, pages={28--35}, year={2008} } format for references 経営情報学会 Gawer, A. and Cusumano, M. A. “How companies become platform leaders”, MIT Sloan management review, Vol.49, No.2, 2008, pp. 28-35. CIRIEC Japan Gawer, A. and Cusumano, M. A. [2008] 「How companies become platform leaders」『MIT Sloan management review』49巻2号, pp. 28-35. LNBIP Gawer, A. and Cusumano, M. A. How companies become platform leaders”, MIT Sloan management review. vol.49, no.2, pp. 28--35. (2008) abstract memo These markets require distinctive com- petitive strategies because the products are parts of systems that combine core components made by one company with complements usually made by a variety of compa- nies. The busi- ness challenges include either making key complements or introducing incentives for third-party companies to create the complementary innovations necessary to build market momentum and defeat competing platforms. Our strategic recommendations consist of two basic approaches. One strategy, “coring,” addresses the challenges of creating a new platform where one has not existed before. “Coring” is the set of activities a company can use to identify or design an element (a technology, a product or a service) and make this element fundamental to a technological system as well as to a market. The platform leader must create economic incentives for ecosys- tem members to invest in creating complementary innovations and to keep doing so over time. In addition, platform-leader wannabes need to protect their ability to profit financially from their innovations, just as any innovator company should. The balancing act — protecting one’s sources of profit while enabling complementors to make an adequate profit and protect their own proprietary knowledge — is perhaps the greatest challenge to platform leadership. example1 Google s search technology make browser venders to implement their service to toolbar example2 Qualcomm s CDMA technology 3 EMC s WideSky Coring Strategic Option How to create a new platform where none existed before Technology Actions to Consider • Solve an essential “system” problem • Facilitate external companies’ provision of add-ons • Keep intellectual property closed on the innards of your technology • Maintain strong interdependencies between platform and complements Business Actions to Consider • Solve an essential business problem for many industry players • Create and preserve complementors’ incentives to contribute and innovate • Protect your main source of revenue and profit • Maintain high switching costs to competing platforms The second strategy, “tipping,” tackles the problem of how to win platform wars by building market momentum.1 For a dom- inant standard and a platform leader to emerge from such standards wars, the markets have to “tip” in favor of a particular technology standard or platform embodying that standard. “Tip- ping” is the set of activities or strategic moves that companies can use to shape market dynamics and win a platform war when at least two platform candidates compete. com- panies should try to gain control over an installed base, broadly license their intellectual property and facilitate partner invest- ments in complementary innovation. see this reference @book{ShapiroVarian1999information, title={{Information rules a strategic guide to the network economy}}, author={Shapiro, C. and Varian, H.R.}, year={1999}, publisher={Harvard Business School Press} } Platform-leader wannabes should also invest in building brand equity as well as manufac- turing, distribution or service capabilities to signal support of the platform. Pricing is another useful strategic weapon,,,, At the opposite extreme, trying to stimulate demand through low or zero pricing for all or part of a platform system can de-stroy the business model for complementors. But there is another powerful way to accomplish tipping “tip- ping across markets,” which others have called “platform envelopment.”10 Tipping across markets occurs when a company crosses over the boundary of its existing market to absorb techni- cal features from an adjacent market and bundle them to extend the company’s platform. see this reference @article{EisenmannEtAl2006strategies, title={{Strategies for two-sided markets}}, author={Eisenmann, T. and Parker, G. and Van Alstyne, M.W.}, journal={Harvard business review}, volume={84}, number={10}, pages={92}, year={2006} } cases Linux for servers, Internet Explorer Tipping Strategic Option How to win platform wars by building market momentum Technology Actions to Consider • Try to develop unique, compelling features that are hard to imitate and that attract users • Tip across markets absorb and bundle technical features from an adjacent market Business Actions to Consider • Provide more incentives for complemen- tors than your competitors do • Rally competitors to form a coalition • Consider pricing or subsidy mechanisms that attract users to the platform There is an important difference between a product and an industry platform. this paper is written about "industry platform" examples; microsoft vs Apple s machintosh, video game consoles because Apple did not open the Mac’s architecture and software to third-party complementors and licensees. We believe that coring is a possible option for any company because technology and architectural leadership do not directly depend on the size of the company. no for web application switching cost of web app is much less than OS or hardware, because it can be used only by accessing certain URI. cited as {Cusumano2010staying Annabelle Gawer and I considered this issue in a recent article and conclueded that, for a product or component technology to have platform potential it should satisfy two conditions. GawerCusumano2008companies First, the product or technology should perform at least one essential function as part of a "system", like the scanning mechanism and playback format in a home video recorder, or the operating software and microprocessor hardware in a personal computer. The function is esencial if it solves a critical system-related problem for the industry, such as how to encode video signals or control the operations of a personal computer or a smartphone. Second, the product or technology should be relatively easy for other companies to connect to with their own products, components, or services in order to improve or expand the functionality of the overall platform system, for both intended and unexpected uses.
https://w.atwiki.jp/famicomall/pages/563.html
前のゲーム | 次のゲーム クリア条件：グッドEDを見る 開始時間：2007/12/02(日) 22 17 39.11 終了時間：2007/12/03(月) 01 45 29.81 げっげげっげっげっげっげげっげっげげわーいえんたっ TKこと小室哲哉先生率いるTM NETWORKの3人とともに ある事件を解決するコマンド選択型ADV。 ストーリーは荒唐無稽ながらもきちんと考えて作られているし、 ボリュームもそこそこなのでTM知ってる人なら 結構楽しめるのではないでしょうか。知らなくても特に支障はない。 がめおべらやバッドEDもあるのでパスワードはちゃんと控えておこうｗ LIVE IN POWER BOWL エピローグ CAST STAFF 主2雑感 このゲーム、ADVだよな…？ 理解不能なフラグ不足でバッドエンドはまだいい。 3Dダンジョンと意味のわからないレースゲームはなんなんだよ。 ただのADVだと思ってたら苦手なもの2連戦やらされるとは思わなんだ。 シナリオは…まぁなんだ… 文明発達し過ぎ。 現実的にそこまで行くのに後何十年かかるんだ、というくらいに。 まぁこのゲームをやって思ったことと言えば…とりあえず、MUE下さい。 ようやく折り返し1本目。 参加できて本当に良かった。
https://w.atwiki.jp/gohongilab2/pages/76.html
tags Jain_S Garud_R url auther Garud, R. and Jain, S. bibtex en @article{GarudJain1997embeddness title={{The Embeddedness of Technological Systems}}, author={Garud, R. and Jain, S.}, journal={Working Paper Series}, year={1997}, publisher={Stern School of Business, New York University}, location={http //hdl.handle.net/2451/14189}, language={English} } format for references * abstract memo ポイントは後ろの方のSummery節とDiscussion 章 このペーパー自体はTCP/IPの普及プロセスを事例に、ベンダーとユーザーが協働して標準化プロセスを進めていく様子を分析。 vendors and users jointly are actively attempting to shape the standard-setting process. These standards, in turn shape activities in the technical environment of product markets, aleit in a loosely coupled fasion. 技術進化の早いITCネットワークでは、美しいde-jureを待っている暇など無く、汚くてもとにかく早く実装して市場投入することが重要。 In certain arenas such as network management and high-speed networking , various vendor groups are cooperating to come up with uick and dirty versions of interoperablity standards rather than wait for standards bodies to come out with the "official" versions. Thus industry wisdom seems to sugest, "Innovate now; clean up afterward." Often, the defacto standard may b ebased on an inferior slution that can require additional rework to conform when a dejure standard comes along. However, proprietary products an make-do standards can sometimes pose a sufficient therat to "official" standards. アプリケーションレイヤでは、ドミナントデザインなんて成立しない。相互可用性を成立させるための手法群であるドミナントソリューションのみが存在する。 The institutional environment, as defined by the standards available at any given point in time, does not completely define activities in the technical environment. In this scenario, there are no dominant designs but only dominant solutions that are forged with the availability of patchwork devices that can "glue" disparate systems together allowing users to mix and match components. 先行研究のまとめ Constant(1980=constant1980origins) demonstrates how the institutional environment of standards (one that he lavels as "traditions of testability") powerfully influence product development activity in the technical environment (see also Garud Rappa, 1994=GarudRappa1994socio). not found @book{constant1980origins, title={{The origins of the turbojet revolution}}, author={Constant, E.W.}, isbn={080182222X}, year={1980}, publisher={Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore, MD} } downloaded @article{GarudRappa1994socio, title={{A socio-cognitive model of technology evolution The case of cochlear implants}}, author={Garud, R. and Rappa, M.A.}, journal={Organization Science}, volume={5}, number={3}, pages={344--362}, issn={1047-7039}, year={1994}, publisher={JSTOR} } compativility standards are a key institutional facet of most inoframtion technology based industries (Garud Kumaraswamy, 1995=GarudKumaraswamy1993changing). In these industries, common standards provide users ande vendors with a platform to use and innovate upon. However, once set, these standards "lock in " users and venders to particulr trajectories, and at the extreame, prevent the technology from migrating to new functionalities (David, 1985=David1985clio; Arthur, 1988=Arthur1988self Farell Saloner, 1986=FarrellSaloner1986installed). downloaded @article{GarudKumaraswamy1993changing, title={{Changing competitive dynamics in network industries An exploration of Sun Microsystems' open systems strategy}}, author={Garud, R. and Kumaraswamy, A.}, journal={Strategic Management Journal}, volume={14}, number={5}, pages={351--369}, issn={1097-0266}, year={1993}, publisher={Wiley Online Library} } downloaded David1985clio @article{David1985clio, title={{Clio and the Economics of QWERTY}}, author={David, P.A.}, journal={The American economic review}, volume={75}, number={2}, pages={332--337}, issn={0002-8282}, year={1985} } to be rent from Mita @article{Arthur1988self, title={{Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics}}, author={ARTHUR, W.B.}, booktitle={The economy as an evolving complex system the proceedings of the Evolutionary Paths of the Global Economy Workshop, held September, 1987 in Santa Fe, New Mexico}, editor={Philip W. Anderson and Kenneth J. Arrow and David Pines} pages={9--31}, isbn={0201156857}, year={1988}, publisher={Addison-Wesley} } downloaded @article{FarrellSaloner1986installed, title={{Installed base and compatibility Innovation, product preannouncements, and predation}}, author={Farrell, J. and Saloner, G.}, journal={The American Economic Review}, volume={76}, number={5}, pages={940--955}, issn={0002-8282}, year={1986}, publisher={JSTOR} } How can tehcnolgies benefit from the coordination that institutional standards can provide while overcoming their constraning effects? We suggest that this can happen when the institutional environment of compativility standards "just" embeds the technical environment of product markets. By "just" embedded we mean that standards and the processes associated with them provide the coordination required to carry out technical activities in the present, and, at the same time, not constrain the migration of the technology to new functionalities in the future.